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FLOWERS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: ANOTHER
COURT REFUSES TO SETTLE THE
QUESTION OF DAMAGES IN
WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
CASES
In tort actions the usual measure of damages is compensatory.' In con-
trast to other forms of relief,2 compensatory damages3 are calculated by
comparing the condition of the injured party had there been no negligent
conduct with the condition of the injured party following negligent con-
duct.4 Calculating compensatory damage awards in tort actions for medical
malpractice5 is, however, an arduous task. For example, it is difficult to
determine accurately the monetary value of a limb that has been lost or dam-
aged because of a physician's negligence. It is even more difficult to deter-
mine the value of a life lost because of negligent conduct. Thus, the issues of
medical malpractice present moral as well as legal questions courts regularly
must answer.
In the last twenty years, courts have begun to recognize a cause of action
in tort based on "wrongful conception," 6 where a physician's negligent per-
1. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
2. Other forms of damage relief include punitive damages and nominal damages. Puni-
tive damages are awarded to punish a party for outrageous conduct and to deter similar ac-
tions in the future. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888, 891 (D.C.
Cir. 1952). Nominal damages are awarded to vindicate a right when no real loss or injury has
been suffered. Id. at 890.
3. Compensatory damages compensate the injured party for the actual damage suffered.
Id. Compensatory damages make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury. Id.
4. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
5. Medical malpractice occurs when a member of the medical profession renders profes-
sional services to a degree of skill and learning below that which is commonly applied by an
average, prudent, and reputable member of the medical community. Washington Hosp.
Center v. Butler, 384 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Quick v. Thurston, 290 F.2d 360, 362
(D.C. Cir. 1961); Rodgers v. Lawson, 170 F.2d 157, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
6. The terms "wrongful life," "wrongful birth," "wrongful conception," and "wrongful
pregnancy" are frequently confused and misused by the courts. "Wrongful life" actions are
brought by the child against a doctor whose negligent actions proximately caused the child's
birth. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 478, 656 P.2d 483, 494 (1983). In
essence, children who bring wrongful life actions claim they should not have been born. Id.
These actions are usually dismissed by the court because it is impossible to calculate the differ-
ence in damages between what the child would have been without the negligent conduct (dead)
and what the child is, with the negligent conduct (a handicapped human being). See Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 II. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (court
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dismissed a suit brought by an illegitimate son against his father for having to live with the fact
of his illegitimacy). In another action, Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967),
the court stated that it
cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself.
By asserting that he [the child] should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes
it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the
impossibility of making the comparison required by compensatory remedies.
Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692 (child brought a wrongful life action against the
doctor for negligently failing to warn the parents about the danger posed from the mother's
having rubella). But see Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). In both of these
cases the courts recognized the child's cause of action for wrongful life, but the courts limited
damages to those extraordinary expenses incurred by the child's defect. See generally Com-
ment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480 (1980).
"Wrongful pregnancy" and "wrongful conception" are terms that may be used interchange-
ably. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1981); Note, Robak v. United
States: A Precedent-Setting Damage Formula for Wrongful Birth, 58 CHl.[-]KENr L. REV.
725, 725 n.2 (1982). (For purposes of this Note, the term "wrongful conception" will be used.)
Wrongful conception occurs when a woman gives birth to a healthy child following the negli-
gent filling of a contraceptive prescription, a negligently performed abortion, or a negligently
performed sterilization operation. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n. 1 (D.S.C.
1981); Note, Robak v. United States: A Precedent-Setting Damage Formula for Wrongful
Birth, 58 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 725, 725 n.2 (1982). Wrongful conception actions are brought
by the parents of the resulting child for damages to compensate them for the "injury" they
have suffered upon the birth of the child. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n. 1
(D.S.C. 1981); Note, Robak v. United States: A Precedent-Setting Damage Formula for Wrong-
ful Birth, 58 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 725, 725 n.2 (1982); Comment, "Wrongful Life": The
Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480 (1980).
An action for "wrongful birth" is similar to one for "wrongful conception" except that in a
wrongful birth action the resulting child is unhealthy in some way. Phillips v. United States,
508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.l (D.S.C. 1981); Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be
Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 485 (1980). Although in wrongful birth actions the resulting child
is unhealthy, wrongful birth and wrongful conception actions arise under several similar cir-
cumstances as follows: (1) When a physician negligently performs a vasectomy on a man who
later impregnates a woman; (2) When a physician negligently performs a sterilization opera-
tion on a woman who subsequently becomes pregnant; (3) When a physician incorrectly per-
forms an abortion; and (4) When a physician negligently fails to inform a woman that she is
pregnant in time for her to have an abortion. Note, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of
Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 65, 66-67 (1981) (citations omitted).
Wrongful birth also occurs in two other circumstances. First, it occurs when a physician
negligently informs a pregnant woman that her fetus is healthy, but it is not. Second, it occurs
when a physician negligently fails to inform a woman that a disease she has threatens the
health of her fetus. Id. In all wrongful birth and wrongful conception cases the parents, rather
than the child, bring the action for damages incurred during and after the pregnancy. For
further discussion of terminology, see Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n. 1
(D.S.C. 1981); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 521 (Iowa 1984); Note, Wilbur v. Kerr: The
Tort of Wrongful Birth in Arkansas, 36 ARK. L. REV. 429, 430 n.7 (1982); Note, Robak v.
United States: A Precedent-Setting Damage Formula for Wrongful Birth, 58 CHI.[-]KENT L.
REv. 725, 725 n.2 (1982); Note, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L.
REV. 65 (1981); Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv.
480, 485 (1980).
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formance of a sterilization operation results in the birth of a healthy child.7
Today, recognition of this cause of action' is unanimous among jurisdictions
that have addressed the issue.9 There is no consensus, however, on what
damages a plaintiff should recover in such a case. One court has offered
guidelines by stating that proper damages can be determined by treating a
wrongful pregnancy ° action as a medical malpractice suit, governed by pub-
lic policy considerations and tort principles.11 These guidelines do not offer
much assistance, however, because it is the reconciliation of public policy
issues with tort principles that proves the most troublesome. This problem
is evidenced by the fact that courts have applied four different theories to
measure damages in suits for wrongful conception. 12
Until Flowers v. District of Columbia, 3 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals never had addressed the question of proper damages in a suit for
wrongful conception. 14 In Flowers, although plaintiff underwent a steriliza-
7. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
8. Several of the courts cited in this Note have used the term "wrongful birth" where the
action is, in reality, one for wrongful conception. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
This Note specifically addresses the question of damages in actions for wrongful conception.
9. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 983
(1983); McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1982); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.
2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Univ. of Arizona
Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983); Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445
A.2d 883 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So.
2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
petition for review denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d
193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d
520 (Iowa 1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md.
257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sher-
lock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237,
442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee,
78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Mason v. Western Pa. Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453
A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v.
Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
12. These theories are:
a. The blessing concept, allowing no recovery of damages. See infra text accompanying
notes 21-41.
b. The California rule, allowing complete recovery of damages. See infra text accompanying
notes 42-50.
c. The benefit rule, allowing recovery of damages based on the balancing of the benefits and
injuries resulting from the birth. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
d. The limited recovery rule, allowing recovery of damages based on the actual out-of-
pocket, pregnancy-related damages. See infra text accompanying note 78.
13. 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984).
14. The Flowers court refers to this as an action for wrongful birth. Id. at 1077. The
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tion operation, she subsequently became pregnant. 15 After giving birth to a
healthy child, plaintiff brought a negligence action against her physician.16
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to present to the jury the question of
damages for medical expenses, for pain and suffering, for lost wages during
pregnancy and after the birth, and for the costs of a future sterilization oper-
ation.' 7 The trial court, however, would not allow the plaintiff to present the
question of whether the award should include the costs of rearing the
child.'" The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision not to present the question of damages for childrearing expenses. 9
In a strongly worded dissent, however, Judge Ferren favored awarding dam-
ages that included childrearing costs.2°
This Note will provide an historical analysis of damage awards applied in
wrongful conception cases. Particular emphasis will be placed on the public
policy considerations presented as different theories have evolved. It will
examine the majority and dissenting opinions in Flowers, comparing them
with prior state and federal court decisions. The analysis will suggest the
Flowers majority ignores certain important policy considerations while over-
emphasizing others. The Note will conclude the majority has not set a
strong precedent for the lower courts in the District of Columbia and that
the question of damages in wrongful conception cases remains unsettled.
I. HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE DAMAGES QUESTION
A. The Early Cases and the Blessing Concept
The Supreme Court of Minnesota first addressed the issue of damages for
wrongful conception in 1934 in Christensen v. Thornby.2' In Christensen,
the husband-plaintiff underwent a vasectomy to prevent his wife, who had
experienced great difficulty in the birth of their first child, from becoming
pregnant again.22 When the wife subsequently became pregnant, the hus-
band brought an action against the doctor for deceit in the representation
action is more properly termed wrongful conception, however, because the child born follow-
ing the negligently performed sterilization operation was healthy. Id. at 1074; see also supra
note 6 and accompanying text. This Note will refer to the action as one involving wrongful
conception. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.




19. Id. at 1078.
20. Id. at 1078-83.
21. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
22. Id. at 123-24, 255 N.W. at 621.
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that the vasectomy would prevent conception.23 The plaintiff did not allege
negligence by the doctor and the court found there was no cause of action.24
Because there was no cause of action, the court did not directly address the
question of damages. Dictum indicated, however, that even though the par-
ents had not wanted more children, they had been "blessed" with a child
and that any expenses incurred because of the pregnancy were too remote to
be calculated as damages.25
The next court to address the issue of damages in wrongful conception
cases was a Pennsylvania lower court, in Shaheen v. Knight.26 In Shaheen,
the plaintiff-husband underwent a sterilization operation because he claimed
he could not financially support an additional child.2 7 His wife subsequently
became pregnant, and plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract to
sterilize.28 Essentially relying on the dictum in Christensen and the "blessing
concept," the Pennsylvania lower court held that "to allow damages for the
normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment of
the people.",29 The court further held that allowing damages would force the
doctor to pay for the affection, joy, and fun that plaintiff would experience in
raising the child. 30 Finally, the court found damages would be against pub-
lic policy because there were people who would gladly support the child if
they were given the right of adoption or custody.31 The court reasoned that
because other people were willing to raise the child if given the opportunity,
it did not seem fair to allow plaintiff to keep the child and to force someone
else to support it.
32
Perhaps one of the harshest applications of the "blessing concept" was by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove.33 Gleitman arose
when the plaintiff's physician negligently failed to warn the plaintiff that be-
cause she had contracted rubella (German measles) during her pregnancy,
there was a possibility her child would be born with birth defects.34 Plaintiff
23. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
24. Id. at 124, 255 N.W. at 620.
25. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
26. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Pa. 1957).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 45-46.
31. Id. at 46.
32. Id.; see also Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
33. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). The issue in Gleitman was actually "wrongful birth"
because an unhealthy child was born. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The court
nevertheless focused on the preciousness of human life and applied the "blessing concept" to
this case. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
34. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
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subsequently delivered a baby with birth defects, 3' and the New Jersey
Supreme Court denied all recovery.3 6 The court held the complaint did not
give rise to actionable damages because the damages were not cognizable at
law. Further, the court held that even if the damages were cognizable, pub-
lic policy supporting the pricelessness of life precluded recovery. 37 The
Gleitman court strictly applied the blessing concept and concluded that even
an award of damages to help the expenses of caring for a child with birth
defects contravened public policy.
In essence, the early courts relying on the "blessing concept" concluded
the birth of a child was a gift and not an injury. Consequently, the courts
found it would be against public policy to award damages for what was in
reality a blessing.3 These courts also reasoned that an award of damages
was against public policy because of the possible emotional trauma to the
child when he learned his parents felt injured by his birth. Finally, these
courts found that damages awarded for the birth of a child were antithetical
to the "family" as an institution3a because such an award tended to lessen
the value of human life.' Thus, while the early courts often recognized
parents suffered physically and financially from the birth of unplanned chil-
dren, they continually denied recovery. 4
B. The California Rule
Today, most courts reject a strict application of the blessing concept,
which states that any damage award for wrongful conception is against pub-
lic policy.42 The first court significantly departing from the blessing concept
was the California Court of Appeal in Custodio v. Bauer.4 3 In Custodio, the
plaintiff underwent a sterilization operation because pregnancy would have
aggravated an existing medical condition." When plaintiff later became
pregnant, and gave birth to a healthy child, she brought a negligence action
against her physician.45
35. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
36. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
37. Id., 227 A.2d at 693.
38. Shaheen, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45-46.




42. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967); Shaheen v. Knight,
11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (1957).
43. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
44. Id. at 307, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
45. Id. at 308, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
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The California Court of Appeal held that the parents of ari unplanned,
healthy child could recover all damages proximately caused by a negligently
performed sterilization operation. The court noted damages could include
all those damages directly related to the pregnancy, such as medical ex-
penses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and the costs to raise the child to the
age of majority.46 The court did not find this award contravened public pol-
icy because the award was not based on a calculation of the value of a child's
life or on the child's worth.4 7 Instead, the award reflected the amount
needed "to replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival [would]
not deprive the other members of the family of what was planned as their
just share of the family income.",48 In addition, the court found a family
experiences loss when an unplanned child is born because the parents must
make their protection, care, support, and comfort available to more people.49
The court reasoned that if the change in family status can be measured in
economic terms, then it is compensable.5 °
C. The Benefit Rule Balancing Test
While Custodio represented a significant departure from the "blessing"
concept, at the same time society as a whole was witnessing a significant
change in its attitude toward women and the family. Several commentators
have pointed to "judicial indications of shifts in the public conscience."51
The changing public conscience toward wrongful conception was clearly rec-
46. Id. at 321-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-78.
47. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
48. Id., 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
49. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
50. Id. at 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
51. Note, Wilbur v. Kerr: The Tort of Wrongful Birth in Arkansas, 36 ARK. L. REV. 429,
441 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Note, Robak v. United States: A Precedent-Setting Dam-
age Formula for Wrongful Birth, 58 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 725, 732-33 (1982); Note, Wrongful
Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 71-72 (1981). These commenta-
tors discuss the importance of two Supreme Court cases that exemplify the shift in public
sentiment: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
Griswold signifies the first judicial shift. In Griswold, the Supreme Court held that it was an
unconstitutional infringement of privacy for states to prevent the use of contraceptives. Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 485. In essence, the Court, for the first time, recognized that family planning
was not against public policy. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Note, Wilbur v. Kerr:
The Tort of Wrongful Birth in Arkansas, 36 ARK. L. REV. 429, 441-42 (1982). See generally
Note, Constitutional Law: Supreme Court Finds Marital Privacy Immunized from State Intru-
sion as a Bill of Rights Periphery, 66 DUKE L.J. 562 (1966).
Eight years later in Roe, the Supreme Court held that a woman's fundamental right to
privacy included her right to an abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Consequently, the mother's
right to choose an abortion would, within certain limitations, supersede the fetus' right to life.
Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Note, Robak v. United States: A Precedent-Setting Damage
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ognized by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Troppi v. Scarf,5 2 which
marked the application of the benefit rule,53 a third approach to damage
awards in wrongful conception actions.
In Troppi, a pharmacist negligently filled a birth control pill prescription
with a mild tranquilizer.54 Relying on the "pills," the plaintiff used no other
form of contraception and subsequently became pregnant. 5 She gave birth
to a healthy baby and brought suit for wrongful pregnancy.56 Finding no
reason to preclude the trier of fact from assessing damages in this action as it
would in any other negligence action, the Michigan Court of Appeals relied
on the general rule of damages applicable to tort actions.57
The calculation of damages in tort actions requires the use of the benefit
rule.58 Applying the benefit rule, a court balances like interests to determine
whether the tortious conduct, in effect, has benefited the plaintiff in some
way. Here, the court balanced the benefits of childrearing against the ele-
ments of claimed damages (including economic costs, anxiety, pain, and suf-
fering). The court reasoned it could weigh these factors because all were
inextricably related to childrearing and, thus, represented the same
interest.59
Several other jurisdictions, including the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, also have applied a balancing test to
Formula for Wrongful Birth, 58 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 725, 733 (1982). See generally Smith,
The Right to Privacy: Roe v. Wade Revisited, 43 JURIST 289 (1983).
52. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
53. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977) summarizes the benefit rule:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
Id. Therefore, if defendant's tortious conduct confers a benefit to the same interest that the
conduct harmed, then the dollar amount of the benefit is subtracted from the dollar amount of
the injury.
54. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 512.
55. Id., 187 N.W.2d at 512-13.
56. Id., 187 N.W.2d at 513.
57. Id. at 252, 187 N.W.2d at 516; see supra text accompanying notes 1, 4; see also supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
59. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518. The court further conceded that
determining a monetary value for intangible benefits is somewhat uncertain, but that "diffi-
culty in determining the amount to be subtracted from the gross damages does not justify
throwing up our hands and denying recovery altogether." Id. at 261, 187 N.W.2d at 521. The
court also stated that recovery for wrongful death depended upon a calculation of the value of
a person's services and companionship. Id. at 262, 187 N.W.2d at 521. Further, the court
implied that if wrongful death damages could be ascertained, then wrongful conception dam-
ages could be maintained as well. Id.
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determine damages in wrongful conception actions. 60 For example, in
Hartke v. McKelway,61 the District of Columbia Circuit Court recognized
the District of Columbia courts had not addressed the issue of damages in
wrongful pregnancy actions.62 After discussing the various approaches used
previously by other courts, the court in Hartke concluded that "allowing the
plaintiff to prove that raising a child constitutes damage is the course of
greater justice, and the one the District of Columbia courts may well
adopt."
63
The court stated it saw "no significant distinction between the task here
[of awarding and determining damages in a wrongful conception case] and
the analogous task of fixing damages for wrongful death, for pain and suffer-
ing, or for extended loss of consortium." 64 It recognized, however, that
there were difficulties in determining an appropriate award of damages,
which would vary depending upon the circumstances.65 Thus, the court
found the trier of fact must look to the reasons66 for seeking a sterilization
operation in determining the extent to which parents are injured.6 7
In Hartke, the plaintiff sought sterilization for therapeutic reasons.68 She
had a history of serious pregnancy-related problems, as well as other gyneco-
logical problems and greatly feared for her health.6 9 One doctor had told
the plaintiff she could not survive another pregnancy.7" The fear of becom-
60. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 983
(1983) (benefits of childrearing may be offset against the expenses thereof); Univ. of Arizona
Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983) (trier of fact
may consider the pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements of damage relating to childrearing
offset by the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits received by the parents from their parental
relationship with the child); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982) (childrear-
ing expenses held recoverable, but should be reduced by value of the benefits received by the
parents from having a child); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984) (trier of
fact may consider awarding damages for childrearing costs offset by the benefits received by
the parents from the child's comfort, society, and aid); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1971) (the benefits of a child may be weighed against the elements of damage);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (costs of rearing the child are
recoverable, but must be offset by value of child's aid, comfort and society).
61. 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 983 (1983).
62. Id. at 1551.
63. Id. at 1552.
64. Id. at 1552 n.8 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 1553.
66. The court discussed three possible reasons for seeking sterilization. These included:
(1) socioeconomic, to avoid disruption of lifestyle or career, or to conserve family resources;
(2) eugenic, to avoid the birth of a handicapped child; and (3) therapeutic, to avoid dangers to
the mother's health during pregnancy and childbirth. Id. at 1553-54.
67. Id. at 1553-55.
68. Id. at 1556.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1549.
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ing pregnant was so great that her boyfriend offered to have a vasectomy if
there were any risk of the plaintiff becoming pregnant following the
sterilization.7
Based upon these facts, the court reasoned that because the plaintiff had
given birth to a healthy baby and the mother, herself, was healthy, the risks
prompting her to avoid future pregnancies did not exist.72 The court con-
cluded that when a couple seeks "sterilization solely for therapeutic or eu-
genic reasons, it seems especially likely that the birth of a healthy child,
although unplanned, may be, as it is for most parents, a great benefit to
them.",73 The court further concluded that under these circumstances a jury
could not rationally find the plaintiff was injured by the birth of a healthy
child and, therefore, she could not recover damages for costs to rear the
child.74
D. The Majority Rule of the Limited Recovery Theory
While the Custodio75 theory of awarding complete damages has not been
followed, many jurisdictions76 have applied the balancing test of Troppi.
77
The method used by the majority of courts to determine damages in wrong-
ful conception cases, however, affords plaintiffs a more limited recovery than
does the balancing test. Relying partially on the blessing concept, the major-
ity of courts calculate damages by determining the out-of-pocket, direct,
pregnancy-related expenses only, and do not allow any recovery for
childrearing costs. Jurisdictions employing this method have allowed recov-
ery for lost wages, medical expenses, cost of a future sterilization operation,
loss of consortium and comfort, and for the pain and suffering endemic to
pregnancy and childbirth.78 This was the theory followed by the District of
71. Id. at 1547, 1549.
72. Id. at 1557.
73. Id. at 1554.
74. Id. at 1557.
75. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes
43-50.
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying
text.
78. See, e.g., McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1982); Boone v. Mullen-
dore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982);
Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984);
Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition for review
denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982);
P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434
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Columbia Court of Appeals in Flowers.
II. FLOWERS v DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: CONFLICTING PRIORITIES
A. Differing Public Policy Mandates
In Flowers, the plaintiff, Geraldine Flowers, underwent a sterilization op-
eration after deciding she could not financially support additional children.79
Two years after the operation, however, Flowers gave birth to a healthy
baby.8" She filed suit against the District of Columbia alleging the steriliza-
tion operation had been negligently performed and that she had become
pregnant and had given birth as a proximate result of the negligence. 81
At trial, Flowers sought compensation for all expenses directly related to
the pregnancy and birth,82 as well as the costs of rearing the child to the age
of eighteen.83 The trial court permitted the jury to hear all of plaintiff's
claims except the claim for childrearing costs.84 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.85
On appeal, the Flowers court considered whether the trial court had erred
in ruling Flowers could not pursue her claim for childrearing costs. 86 Flow-
ers contended that because this was a typical medical malpractice case, the
standard principles of tort law should apply.87 According to the court, the
standard principles of tort law required application of the benefit rule 88 and
the doctrine of avoidable consequences.8 9 On public policy grounds the
court expressly refused to apply either of these rules.90 The majority instead
applied the theory of damages based on directly-related costs and outlined
four public policy reasons for rejecting a recovery based on childrearing
N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Mason v. Western Pa. Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
79. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1074.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. These expenses included medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and the
cost of a future sterilization operation. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1078.
86. Id. at 1074.
87. Id. at 1075.
88. See supra text accompanying note 53.
89. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1076. The avoidable consequences doctrine states that "one in-
jured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have
avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977).
90. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1076-77.
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costs.9 1
The majority concluded that any recovery for childrearing costs was
against public policy because it required some application of the benefit
rule.92 This rule balances the positive and negative factors attributable to
the birth of a child. The court here determined this would require placing a
dollar value on a child to ascertain the monetary benefit conferred to the
parents as well as the actual expenses incurred by the parents upon the
child's birth. 93 The court observed that as a result parents would tend to
minimize the child's worth and thereby denigrate him "to minimize the off-
set to which the defendant is entitled.",
94
In addition, the majority found that an award for childrearing costs was
against public policy because it also required application of the avoidable
consequences doctrine.95 Under this doctrine a plaintiff must prove "that he
could not have reasonably avoided the consequences of the physicians' negli-
gence."'96 The court recognized the only way to avoid the consequences of a
physician's negligence in a wrongful conception case is for the mother to
give up the child for adoption or to undergo an abortion.9 7 The court con-
cluded that applying the avoidable consequences doctrine forces the jury to
consider these alternatives, even though they are "matters that seem particu-
larly unsuited for the traditional adversarial process."98
The majority further determined that childrearing cost recovery is against
public policy because the award has a destabilizing effect on the family. 99 In
essence, the award forces a third party, the physician, to provide financially
for the child, which the court found harmful to family unity. Finally, the
majority held that an award of damages is against public policy because it is
"wholly disproportionate to the culpability"" of the defendant-physician.
91. Id. at 1074-78.
92. Id. at 1076. See also supra note 53.
93. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1076.
94. Id. (quoting Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 I11.2d 193, 202, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
95. See supra note 89.
96. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1077.
97. Id. The majority expressly stated, however, that it was not suggesting that a jury
would necessarily find abortion or adoption reasonable ways to avoid the consequences of
raising an unwanted child. Id. at 1077 n.4. The court nevertheless suggested a jury might find
them reasonable. Id.
98. Id. at 1077.
99. Id. The court found that § 16-4501 of the District of Columbia Code mandates a
policy of a stable home environment and that a damage award for wrongful conception under-
mines this policy. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4501 (1983).
100. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1077 (quoting Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,432, 404 A.2d 8, 14
(1979), where the issue was actually "wrongful birth" because an unhealthy child was born.
See supra text accompanying note 6).
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The court determined an award places an unreasonable burden on the physi-
cian, while allowing all the benefits to be enjoyed by the parents. 101
Dissenting from the majority opinion, Judge Ferren rejected the major-
ity's reasoning and its partial return to the blessing concept. Instead, he
wrote in favor of the benefit rule. Judge Ferren's application of the benefit
rule, however, differed from the application enunciated in Troppi. The
Troppi court found the tangible and intangible damages and benefits of
childrearing could be balanced because they were so inextricably related as
to represent the same interest.' 0 2 In Flowers, however, Judge Ferren stated
the tangible and intangible costs and benefits of childrearing do not represent
the same interests 10 3 and, therefore, cannot balance each other.
The proper application, according to Judge Ferren, would require a plain-
tiff to present evidence that economic reasons motivated her sterilization."°
Evidence presented by the defendant-physician to the contrary, for example,
that plaintiff was well-situated financially, would offset plaintiff's allegations.
Plaintiff then would present evidence of reasonable childrearing expenses
again to be balanced against evidence presented by the defendant-physician
regarding the unreasonableness of these expenses., 0 5 This literal application
of the rule requires only like interests to be balanced. Unlike Troppi, how-
ever, this application does not require the court to calculate the monetary
value to the parents of a child's comfort, joy, love, and affection. Thus, as
used by Judge Ferren, the rule does not mandate any valuation of the child's
worth and there is no risk that parents may denigrate the child.'o 6
Judge Ferren also observed an award of damages could be pro-family
rather than anti-family. He stated an award may relieve some of the finan-
cial burden and stress that could result from the birth of an unplanned child.
An award thus may increase family harmony. Judge Ferren concluded the
parents then may concentrate on providing the child and his siblings with
the love and affection they need, rather than focusing on the family's finan-
cial situation.0 7 Finally, the dissent noted that public policy demands some
mechanism to deter negligent acts, and that wrongdoers must be held re-
sponsible for the foreseeable consequences of their wrongful acts.1
0 8
101. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1077 (citing Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 184, 434 N.Y.S.2d
300, 303 (1980)).
102. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
103. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1080-81.
104. Id. at 1081.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1079.
108. Id. at 1083.
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B. Selective Public Policy Mandates
There is no doubt the majority's decision to award only directly-related
costs as damages is the current majority rule.1°9 There are, however, several
problems with this approach. First, the majority in Flowers completely ig-
nores the test established in Hartke." ° In an action for wrongful concep-
tion, the Hartke court found if a plaintiff underwent a sterilization procedure
for therapeutic or eugenic reasons, then the subsequent birth of a healthy
child to a healthy mother would be a great benefit to the parents."' From
this analysis it follows that if a plaintiff had a sterilization operation for fi-
nancial reasons, then the plaintiff would suffer financial damages from the
birth of a child. In other words, a plaintiff who wanted to limit family size
for financial reasons would be injured by having to raise an additional, un-
planned child. Applying this analysis to Flowers, the plaintiff suffered real
financial harm from the birth of an unplanned child.
The dissent's application of the benefit rule, however, is consistent with
the Hartke analysis. According to Judge Ferren, once plaintiff proves that
financial reasons motivated the decision to become sterilized, the defendant-
physician has an opportunity to present evidence to the contrary. 1 2 This is
an effective way to balance like interests and satisfies the requirements of the
benefit rule.
Secondly, the majority insists that the avoidable consequences doctrine
must be applied if standard tort principles are applied to determine dam-
ages."' The avoidable consequences doctrine requires that plaintiff make
reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages. As noted by the majority, in
wrongful conception cases, abortion and adoption are two ways to avoid the
necessary consequences of a physician's negligence and to mitigate dam-
ages."' By not expressly dismissing these alternatives as unreasonable or
against public policy, the court implies a jury could find abortion and adop-
tion reasonable methods of mitigation. In a footnote the court stated it did
not "conclude that a court or jury would necessarily find abortion or adop-
tion to be a reasonable method of avoiding the consequences."11 ' Neverthe-
less, the court further noted that a court or jury would "be called upon to
consider this alternative as an exercise of choice by the parent before having
109. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
110. Hartke, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 983 (1983).
111. Id. at 1554.
112. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1081.
113. Id. at 1077.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1077 n.4.
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the child."' 16
Thus, the majority in Flowers would find it necessary to allow the jury to
consider the fact that plaintiff did or did not choose one of these alternatives
if it applied standard tort principles to measure the damages. In essence, the
majority suggests that adoption and abortion may be reasonable considera-
tions. The majority also stated, however, that adoption and abortion are
"highly personal matters that seem particularly unsuited for the traditional
adversarial process." '117 Yet, the court concluded that abortion and adop-
tion are reasonable enough to allow court or jury consideration. 118 The ma-
jority's recognition of unreasonable and unsuitable alternatives substantially
weakens its holding and blurs the guidelines for future decisions.
Judge Ferren's dissent is more persuasive. According to the dissent, be-
cause these matters are unsuited for the adversarial process, they are unrea-
sonable alternatives and, therefore, a court or jury should not be allowed to
consider them. 9 While abortion and adoption are acceptable practices to
many people, the dissent found it unreasonable for a court to suggest that a
plaintiff consider adoption or abortion.
120
In addition, the court's holding in Flowers does not make clear how the
court will interpret the law on this and similar issues in the future. It pro-
vides no guidelines concerning how it would review a wrongful birth situa-
tion in which the child born under similar circumstances was handicapped.
The court seems to suggest that parents of a handicapped child born follow-
ing a negligently performed sterilization operation would recover at least the
extraordinary costs of rearing the child.1 21 At the same time, however, the
court does not specify whether it would allow such a recovery and thus may
leave future plaintiffs speculating. Further, by implying it would allow the
recovery of damages for the birth of a handicapped child, the majority seems
116. Id. See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984), where the court of
appeals stated, "[m]ost courts which have considered the question have determined, as a mat-
ter of law, that neither course of action [referring to abortion and adoption] would be reason-
able and consequently [consideration thereof] is not required." Id. at 274, 473 A.2d at 438
(citations omitted).
117. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1077.
118. Id. at 1077 n.4.
119. Id. at 1082.
120. Id.; see supra note 116 and accompanying text. But see Public Health Trust v. Brown,
388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition for review denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla.
1981). The court observed the fact that the "'benefits' of parenthood far outweigh any of the
mere monetary burdens involved ... may be deemed conclusively presumed by the fact that a
prospective parent does not abort or subsequently place the 'unwanted' child for adoption."
Id. at 1085-86 (citations omitted); see also Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300
(1980). The court noted "the mother was aware of the unwanted pregnancy from its inception
and did not choose to terminate it." Id. at 183, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
121. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1076 n.3.
1985] 1223
Catholic University Law Review
to suggest that some children are not blessings because of their lack of physi-
cal or mental capacity. Surely this conclusion is as offensive as the conclu-
sion that a perfectly healthy child is not a blessing.
Finally, the majority fails to recognize that its holding ignores a significant
public policy issue. The majority essentially would allow a wrongdoer, a
negligent physician, to escape without punishment for his wrongful acts.
Such a ruling weakens the standard of professional conduct and expertise
demanded in the area of family planning and leaves a vacuum in medical
malpractice recovery. 22 In essence, the ruling exempts the medical profes-




Flowers v. District of Columbia presented the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals with a case of first impression to determine a proper award of
damages for a plaintiff who was the victim of a negligently performed sterili-
zation operation. In balancing various public policy considerations, the
Flowers majority awarded damages based on the widely used theory of di-
rect, pregnancy-related costs. In doing so, the court denied damages for
childrearing costs. While the result of the District of Columbia approach is
certainly supported by other jurisdictions, the court's rationale is confusing
and leaves critical gaps in the guidelines established for similar cases in the
future. Most disturbing is the Flowers court's suggestion that it would be
necessary to allow the jury to consider adoption and abortion as alternatives
to childrearing while simultaneously suggesting that these issues are unsuita-
ble for the adversarial process.
Thus, while the court may have been correct in finding that preservation
of the family requires that it not award childrearing costs in wrongful con-
ception actions, it is doubtful the court has set a strong precedent upon
which future courts may rely. Hopefully, when this issue is presented to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals again, it will more evenly consider all
of the injuries suffered and all of the public policy questions at hand.
Nancy L. White
122. See Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 242, 442 A.2d 1003, 1005 (1982).
123. See Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
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